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REVIEWS

Social Control, Deviance, and
the Law
Dependency in the Welfare State: Beyond
the Due Process Vision
Law and the Search for Community, by JOEL
HANDLER. Philadelphia: University of Penn
sylvania Press, 1990. 176 pp. $25.95 cloth.
ISBN: 0-8122-8201-9.

RICHARD LEMPERT
University of Michigan
The due process revolution has failed.
Never mind that this verdict is an
oversimplified exaggeration. It is closer to
the truth than its opposite. Giving
powerless, dependent, poor people property
interests in their welfare benefits and the
right
to call those who exercise
discretion over them legally into account
does not magically cure the poverty,
powerlessness, or dependency that motivated
the extension of rights in the first instance.
The optimistic view of legality that motivated
much of the social activism of the late sixties
and early seventies inevitably gives way
before the reality of being poor.
No one in the legal academy perceived the
limitations of the legal rights approach earlier
than Joel Handler, nor has anyone articulated
this position more clearly or, for that matter,
more frequently over the years. Now in his
latest book, Law and the Search for Commu-
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nity, Handler, after restating his thesis of the
failure of rights, asks "What's next?" and
comes up with the optimistic answer that it is
at least possible to construct dialogic communities which may empower poor people in a
way that legal rights did not and which can
raise the poor, in the limited sphere of their
dependency, to a status of moral equality with
their official beneficiaries-welfare workers,
medical personnel, and the like. Moreover,
Handler argues, the creation of such communities will be advantageous for both the
dependent poor and the people and agencies
on which they depend. In constructing his
argument Handler draws on legal and sociolegal research, the sociology of organizations,
jurisprudence, with special attention to critical legal, feminist, and modem continental
theorists, and philosophic challenges to liberalism. The result is a book that may be read
profitably by anyone interested in the situation of dependent populations in the modem
welfare state.
Handler's argument rests on two wellsupported premises. The first, to which I have
alluded, is that, at least when measured by the
claims made for it, the due process revolution
has failed dependent poor people. The second
is that the Weberian ideal of rationality has
similarly failed as an explanation of legal and
organizational behavior. The two failures are
not unconnected, for the first is an almost
necessary result of the second. If legal rights
are not necessarily enforced and if official
organizational commitments may be transformed as they are implemented, top-down
extensions of rights and privileges carry no
necessary entitlements for those on the
bottom.
Handler both documents these propositions
and explores the possibilities that exist once
Weberian rationality is discarded as a master
organizing principle of social life. He proceeds to do this by looking at the work of
selected contemporary authors who have
written on the legal rights of dependent
people, regulation and organization, jurisprudence, and modem and postmodern communitarian ethics. The bulk of the book-about
two-thirds of its length-is devottd to this
enterprise. In his exploration of these themes
Handler's voice is submerged, for he advances his arguments by summarizing the
ideas of others. These summaries are not only
clear and concise, but they also are so nicely
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joined that the composite avoids pastiche and
conveys the sense of a coherent, guiding
intelligence.
The first two chapters following the
introduction emphasize the collapse of the
liberal legal vision and the need for those who
wish to understand the situation of poor
people before the law to grasp the reality of
power-a reality that includes not only the
ability to dominate in situations of conflict but
also the ability to prevent grievances from
ever finding a forum that will allow them to
mature into legal conflicts and the still greater
power of preventing the perception of harm in
the first instance.
The second two core chapters explore ways
that people, especially poor, dependent people, may relate to each other, to organizations, and to law once the path of liberalism
has been discarded. Handler argues for a
communitarian relationship based on dialogue-that is, mutually respectful conversation -which has as its goal the empowerment
of poor people and their equal interaction with
authority. He believes such relationships must
be based on what, following Baier (1986), he
calls "morally decent trust," meaning trust
that is "expressible" in that the relationship
can survive the knowledge of why the parties
are remaining in it. While he recognizes the
optimism that underlies the goals he posits,
Handler sees these goals as realizable rather
than utopian. The key to their realization lies
in the establishment of "reciprocal concrete
incentives."
Chapter 6 give three examples of what
relationships of morally decent trust built on
such incentives can look like and one example
of a cooperative relationship that fails on the
trust dimension. As an example of a successful relationship, Handler cites the case of
renal patients who must undergo regular
dialysis. These patients are given a wealth of
information by their doctors and are empowered to participate in their treatment on a
more or less equal basis-certainly on a basis
of mutual dependency and respect-with their
physicians. The key to this relationship is that
the structurally more powerful actor, the
doctor, cannot successfully and cheaply treat
a chronic renal patient without that patient's
cooperation and participation in the treatment.
Thus to succeed by their own terms-that is,
to successfully treat the disease-doctors
must depend on patients. The trust in this
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relation is expressible because doctors can
reveal their motivating goal-the well-being
of the patient-without alienating the patient.
The regulation of water pollution is an
example of a relationship that is not express
ible. Parties cooperate, but not because the
stronger willingly empowers the weaker
(sometimes it is hard to know which is which)
or because there is a shared sense that the two
are working for a common good. Rather, both
the regulated and regulator are motivated, and
perceive the other to be motivated, by
self-interest that for the moment makes
behavior in concert in their mutual best
interest. Absent the threats each party can
bring to bear on the other, the constellation of
interests would change and with it the parties'
behavior.
Ultimately the question with which one
leaves Handler's book is whether his pre
ferred communitarian mode of empowering
poor people is more likely to succeed than the
liberal rights model. True, Handler can point
to instances of its successful instantiation, but
adherents of the legal rights model can point
to instances where extending rights did
empower poor people and made important
differences. The same combination of popular
prejudice, underfunding, staggering case
loads, and street-level discretion that has
subverted the legal rights approach is in my
view likely to do in the alternative approach
implicit in Handler's vision, and Handler
acknowledges this possibility. But even the
skeptic must admit that Handler's alternative
vision rests on a far more sophisticated view
of power and organizational dynamics than
proponents of the liberal legal rights view
ever advanced. This is in itself reason for
those interested in law in the welfare state to
welcome Handler's latest contribution to the
sociolegal and welfare organization litera
tures.
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